Throughout this book the writer who died at a relatively young age, Christopher Hitchens, shows Kissinger subverting populism all over the world and then, one after another he somehow facilitates the installation of fascist type regimes that he can influence in conjunction with elements within the system . We know that Kissinger hides his client list and clearly it has been shown here in this book through his patterns that he’s been working towards the aim of a totalitarian world government controlled by and for him and HIS SECRET CLIENTS.
The text below reveals Kissinger chiding his underlings for letting information escape about his actions as a supposed public servant of the People of the United States. In the instance shown below, Kissinger dreads getting caught regarding genocide against the people of East Timor committed by the clearly Kissinger aligned Indonesian government.
It’s also interesting to note when you read below, you will see manipulation techniques on display. You may recognize the type of shaming and guilt tripping employed frequently in mass media. Agents sent my way used these very same methods of manipulation as well.
The text below continues from here.
[KISSINGER]: It cannot be that our agreement with Indonesia says that the arms are for internal purposes only. I think you will find that it says that they are legitimately used for self-defense. There are two problems. The merits of the case which you had a duty to raise with me. The second is how to put these to me. But to put it into a cable 30 hours before I return, knowing how cables are handled in this building, guarantees that it will be a national disaster and that transcends whatever [Deputy Legal Adviser George] Aldrich has in his feverish mind. I took care of it with the administrative thing by ordering Carlyle [Maw] not to make any new sales. How will the situation get better in six weeks?
HABIB: They may get it cleaned up by then.
[KISSINGER]: The Department is falling apart and has reached the point where it disobeys clear-cut orders.
HABIB: We sent the cable because we thought it was needed and we thought it needed your attention. This was ten days ago.
[KISSINGER]: Nonsense. When did I get the cable, Jerry?
BREMER: Not before the weekend. I think perhaps on Sunday.
[KISSINGER]: You had to know what my view on this was. No one who has worked with me in the last two years could not know what my view would be on Timor. [italics added]
HABIB: Well, let us look at it-talk to Leigh. There are still some legal requirements. I can't understand why it went out if it was not legally required.
[KISSINGER]: Am I wrong in assuming that the Indonesians will go up in smoke if they hear about this?
HABIB: Well, it's better than a cutoff. It could be done at a low level.
KISSINGER]: We have four weeks before Congress comes back. That's plenty of time.
LEIGH: The way to handle the administrative cutoff would be that we are studying the situation.
[KISSINGER]: And 36 hours was going to be a major problem?
LEIGH: We had a meeting in Sisco's office and decided to send the message.
[KISSINGER]: I know what the law is but how can it be in the US national interest for us to give up on Angola and kick the Indonesians in the teeth? Once it is on paper, there will be a lot of FSO-6s who can make themselves feel good who can write for the Open Forum Panel on the thing even though I will turn out to be right in the end.
HABIB: The second problem on leaking of cables is different.
[KISSINGER]: No it's an empirical fact.
EAGLEBURGER: Phil, it's a fact. You can't say that any NODIS [“No Distribution": most restricted level of classification] cable will leak but you can't count on three to six months later someone asking for it [sic] in Congress. If it's part of the written record, it will be dragged out eventually.
[KISSINGER]: You have an obligation to the national interest. I don't care if we sell equipment to Indonesia or not. I get nothing from it, I get no rakeoff. But you have an obligation to figure out how to serve your country. The Foreign Service is not to serve itself. The Service stands for service to the United States and not service to the Foreign Service.
HABIB: I understand that that's what this cable would do.
[KISSINGER]: The minute you put this into the system you cannot resolve it without a finding.
LEIGH: There's only one question. What do we say to Congress if we're asked?
[KISSINGER]: We cut it off while we are studying it. We intend to start again in January.
…
The delivery of heavy weapons for use against civilian objectives did indeed resume in January 1976, after a short interval in which Congress was misled as advertised. Nobody, it must be said, comes especially well out of this meeting; the Secretary's civil servants were anything but “pristine." Still it can be noted of Kissinger that, in complete contrast to his public statements, he:
1. Forebore from any mention of Goa.
2. Did not trouble to conceal his long-held views on the matter, berating his underlings for being so dense as not to know them.
3. Did not affect to be taken by surprise by events in East Timor.
4. Admitted that he was breaking the law.
5. Felt it necessary to deny that he could profit personally from the arms shipments, a denial for which nobody had asked him.
Evidently, there was a dialectic in Kissinger's mind between Angola and East Timor, both of them many miles from US or Russian borders but both seen as tests of his own dignity. (The "surrounding states" to which he alludes in the Angolan case were apartheid South Africa and General Mobutu's Zaire: the majority of African states, as a matter of record, opposed his intervention on the side of the tribalist and pro-South Africa militias in Angola. His favored regimes have long since collapsed in ignominy; the United States now recognizes the MPLA, with all its deformities, as the legitimate government of Angola. And of course, no European ever felt that the fate of the West hinged on Kissinger's gamble in Luanda.