We continue to explore a scenario where Kissinger is very agitated about a dissident and he is clearly not on the side of the people. Why has a foreign born man been guiding American policy for all of these decades?
It would appear safe to say, then, that Demetracopoulos was taken with sufficient seriousness by Kissinger to warrant a slanderous and paranoid memorandum for the President's desk.
This only strengthens the argument made in chapter 9, that Kissinger was attempting to represent his Greek critic as a person dangerous and sinister enough to be dealt with.
Another declassified secret document, this time of a "Secretary's Analytical Staff Meeting" at the State Department on 20 March 1974, shows Kissinger's obsession at work again.
Irritated by talk of a return to constitutional rule in Greece, he said: “My question is: Why is it in the American interest to do in Greece what we apparently don't do anywhere else-of requiring them to give a commitment to the President to move to representative government?"
This was only a few months after the existing right-wing dictatorship in Athens had been overthrown from the extreme right by the psychopath Brigadier Ioannidis. Even Henry Tasca, then United States Ambassador to Athens and a trusted friend of the regime, was moved to reply:
Well, I think because Greece and the Greek people-in terms of their position and public opinion in Western Europe are quite unique. You can go back to the constitutional Greece or the Greek lobby-whatever you want to call it-and they've got a position in Western Europe and the United States that Brazil and Chile and these other countries don't have.
None of these countries has a Demetracopoulos-a Greek refugee who's been activated and who for four years has been leading a very vigorous fight on our policy in Greece.
To this Kissinger made the glacial reply that "That just means we're letting Demetracopoulos's particular group make policy." But he was clearly nettled that some of his own deputies found it difficult to treat Greece as a banana republic.
This was a high-level meeting. The minutes record the attendance of such policy heavyweights as Joseph Sisco, Helmut Sonnenfeld, Lawrence Eagleburger and Arthur Hartman.
It is clear that the dangerous activity of a single dissident was not beneath official attention. Once again, I note that the Greek government, for which Kissinger was acting as proxy here, was a murderous and torturing dictatorship, with aggressive designs upon its Cypriot neighbor, and that its then leaders are now in prison for life.
And once again, I note that their senior partner and patron is still at liberty, and still lying about his part in all this.
Legal Consequences
Just as this book was being published, Kissinger produced a volume of his own with the pseudo-solemn title Does America Need a Foreign Policy? It contained an anxious chapter on the perils of the new legal doctrine of "universal jurisdiction," and this same chapter was reprinted as a separate essay in the Establishment's house-organ, Foreign Affairs.
There was a certain amount of public laughter at the sheer disingenuousness of this: Kissinger wrote as if he was cogitating the subject with absolute disinterest.
Events, however, were to give independent validation of his professed concern. In May 2001, Judge Rodolfo Corral, a senior magistrate in Argentina, issued a summons to Kissinger to answer questions about his knowledge of Operation Condor.
Judge Corral's investigation, like many similar human rights inquiries in the southern hemisphere of the Americas, could proceed no further without disclosure of what the United States knew and when it knew it, and Kissinger was the chief material witness at all material times.
Only a few days later, on 28 May 2001, Kissinger was visited in his suite at the Ritz Hotel in Paris by the criminal division of the French gendarmerie.
They brought him a summons, issued by Judge Roger Le Loire, to appear at the Palais de Justice the following morning and answer questions about the "disappearance" of five French citizens in Chile during the early days of the Pinochet regime.
Kissinger might reasonably have thought himself safe in the hotel owned by Mohammed al-Fayed, but chose the path of prudence and left Paris at once. (The summons remains valid if he should ever choose to return; I should like to boast briefly that the European press attributed this judicial move in part to the then-recent appearance of this book in its French translation.)
Since then, the Chilean courts-including the judge who is deciding the Pinochet case itself-have written to Kissinger asking for his cooperation as a witness in the case of Charles Horman, an American reporter murdered during Pinochet's coup, and in the general matter of "Condor"-related crime.
This means that duly constituted magistrates in three democratic nations are seeking-and are being refused-his testimony on grave crimes against humanity.
As predicted in my introduction he can no longer make travel plans without consulting his expensive attorneys. Most serious of all, though, was the suit filed in Federal Court in Washington, DC, on 10 September 2001.
This suit is brought by the surviving members of the family of General Rene Schneider of Chile. It charges Kissinger and others with "summary execution" of the General; in other words, but in a civil case, with murder and international terrorism.
The date of the lawsuit may seem unpropitious to some, but in fact the hideous aggression against American civil society that occurred the following day has laid greater emphasis than ever on the need for a single standard, and one day a single international court, for the hearing of crimes against humanity, state-sponsored murder and international nihilism.